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CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND THE PARTNERSHIP
By JA-xms R. RICHARDSON*
The nature of and the quality of partnershup property is the
background and basis for some troublesome problems m the
law of partnership. Another form of business association, the
private corporation, being considered a fictional person, an entity
unto itself, has prevented these same problems arising with re-
spect to corporate held property and rights incident thereto.'
Neither the American nor English decisions have to any extent
clothed the partnership with the characteristics of legal per-
sonality and the commensurate right to sue and be sued, con-
tract and be contracted with, and hold property (real) in the
firm name.2 True enough, for some purposes and in some in-
stances the courts are prone to treat partnerships as legal entities.
However, the result when reached seems to be for reasons of
expediency with respect to the facts and circumstances of the
particular case, rather than with a view to furnishing a line of
cases from which a rule of consistency may be evolved. The
situation has been aptly stated thusly- "To what extent partner-
ships have been or should be treated as possessing legal per-
sonality by legislatures and courts has been a matter of con-
siderable dispute."
3
0 Assoc. Prof. of Law, University of Florida; A.B. Eastern Kentucky Teachers
College, LL.B. University of Kentucky.1 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat, 518, 4 L. Ed. 629
(1819), herein appears Justice Marshall's familiar and oft quoted definition of a
corporation, to wit: "An artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law."
"A partnership can really own no property. The property of the firm is
owned by the members thereof." Adams v. Blunfield, 27 N.W 643, 204 P. 60
(1922), but see U.P.A. See. 8, "Any estate in real property may be acquired in
the partnership name." Suits affecting partnership affairs must be brought by
or against the members of the firm, not in the firm name. Kent v. Nat'l. Sup. Co.
of Texas, 36 S.W 2d 811, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
3 CRANE ON PAR TNERSIP, See. 8, p. 9. Following the rule of the civil law
countries a partnership is treated as a legal entity in Louisiana, Clements v. Luby
Oil Co., 15 La. App. 384, 130 So. 851 (1930). Liability insurance on a partner-
ship which has been held not effective where the vehicle was not being used on
firm business, Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N. Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789
(1919). There, is a strong line of cases that accept the "mercantile" view of
partnersip entity in contra-distinction to the common law. People v. Zangain,
301 Ill. 299, 133 N.E. 783 (1922); Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241,
149 A 746 (1930); Thurston v. Detroit Asphalt Paving Co., 226 Mich. 505, 198
N.W 345 (1924).
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The members of a partnership as regards partnership property
have been regarded as joint tenants,4 and the tenancy m part-
nership created by the Uniform Partnership ActO is an mnova-
tion m the common law It was an outgrowth of this practice
of courts to treat partners as joint tenants of partnership property
that led to inequitable results, particularly as to joint tenants un-
restrained power of disposition. The result was "very great
confusion"0 where separate creditors tried to reach partnership
property or where a partner attempted to dispose of it for his
own purposes.
From experience which demonstrated necessity the law courts
began to distinguish between interests of individual partners
and that of the partnership itself in partnership property, a dis-
tinction to be found in the Uniform Partnership Act.
7
I. Rights of Separate Creditors in Partnership Property
Since individuals -irst began to engage in private commercial
enterpnses for gain by the pooling of property and skill or abilities
as assets for furtherance of their objectives, the partnership has
been a favorite form for such venture and was the forerunner of
such other business associations as the statutory limited partner-
ship, business trust, joint-stock associations, and private corpora-
tions. This form of business association, due to the close as-
sociations, agency relationship, and unlimited liability is not
recommended for any other than those bound together by ties
of friendship and mutual trust, with especial emphasis on the
latter.
When men transfer a portion of their assets in a manner to
relinquish the individual use and control thereof to some degree,
it is inevitable that questions will arise as to the availability of
such transferred fund or part thereof to the claims of creditors
of the individual partner.
It would be strange indeed if one might by forming or be-
coming a member of a partnership insulate his personal assets
from the just claims of a creditor, and the law does not thus
'Windom National Bank v. Klein, 191 Minn. 447 254 N.W 602 (1984).
"U.P.A. Sec. 25 (1).
6 Comrmssioner s Note, 7 U.L.A. 33.
1U.P.A. Sees. 24-28.
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permit a partnership to become a vehicle for the perpetration of
a fraud intentional or otherwise. Without dissent the cases are
in accord on this point; however, the extent of the right and the
manner in which an individual creditor may enforce the right
to subject partnership property to the extinguishment of his claim
has been the cause of much confusion and disagreement in the
decisions of our courts.
A stream can rise no higher than its source; a creditor can
acquire no greater interest than his debtor. So it is that the
interest of a partner m partnership property is an essential in
rationalizing the problem.
Let us first consider a fairly early Tennessee case in which
the court discusses the question in a lucid manner.' The ques-
tion before the court was whether specific property, to-wit, a lot
of iron pipe and other material belonging to a partnership, was
subject to levy for the individual debt of a member of the firm.
The court reluctantly answers this question in the affirmative,
recognizing that it is bond by its own Supreme Court's holding.
However, the purchaser takes only the interest of the judgment
debtor after settlement and adjustment of partnership accounts,
the court following the common law rule that partnership prop-
erty belongs to the partnership and one partner has no interest
in it, but Ins share of what remains after all the partnership debts
are paid.
In the ultimate, the substantive rule that an execution can-
not reach any higher interest in property than the debtor himself
enjoys is recognized. Yet procedurally the execution officer does
something the partner has no right to do in taking exclusive
possession and jurisdiction over specific partnership property,
the partners being in the nature of trustees as to each other
with respect to firm property '0
This latter fact creates the hardship which the Tennessee
court deplores but is constrained to follow The partners have
a contract,, the performance of which may well prove profitable,
Johnson v. Wingfield, 42 S.W 208 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).
'Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242 (1810).
' "The weight of authority seems to be, that an officer holding a writ of
execution or attachment against an individual partner, may levy upon his interest,
and ma' seize and hold partnership property, and may sell the interest of the in-
dividual partner in such property." Hershfield v. Chaflin, 25 Kan. 115, 37 Am.
Rep. 237 (1881). See discussion, infra.
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but the physical levy on essential matenal can prevent perform-
ance and work an inequitable result on an innocent partner or
partners. The court conceives the law in Tennessee to be as
follows:
1. That partnership property may be levied on by the
creditors for the individual debt of a member of the firm.
2. That specific property may be levied on, and it is not
necessary that the execution be levied on all the prop-
erty of the firm.
3. That the officer may, and that m fact it is his duty to,
take actual possession of the property levied on, and to
retain it until the sale is made.
4. That the purchaser only takes the interest of such judg-
ment debtor after the settlement and adjustment of the
partnership account, or as has been otherwise stated a
mere right to an accounting.
5. That a levy is necessary m order to fix a lien so as to
authorize the filing of a bill.
Undoubtedly the decision in this Tennessee case represents
the minority opinion at common law m holding that a portion
of partnership property may be seized by levy of execution. It
is faulty in that an individual partner s interest is indivisible, as
hereinbefore pointed out, and hence he can have no specific
interest in chattels subject to levy Debts due from the joint or
partnership fund must be paid before any partner has the right
to appropnate any thereof to his individual use, and the partner s
creditor cannot claim that which his debtor cannot claim. Per-
haps then in a manner of speaking the Tennessee decision per-
mits that to be done indirectly which cannot be done directly,
certainly that is done involuntarily where it could not be done
voluntarily
Contrary to the decision in the principal case, the weight
of authority is that an officer who proceeds under a separate
creditor s execution must seize the whole of leviable partnership
property' 1 As has been mentioned, the officer sells only an
interest, the debtor partner's interest, which the purchaser must,
U " the sheriff must seize all, because the moieties are undivided; for if
he seize but a moiiety and sell that, the other will have a right to a moiety of
that moiety- but he must seize the whole, and sell a moiety thereof undivided
and the vendee will be a tenant m common with the other partner." Heydon v.
Heydon, 1 Salk. 392 (1693); Daniels v. Alabama, 70 Ala. 297 (1881); Weber v.
Heitz, 188 Ill. 68, 58 N.E. 676 (1900); Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647, 80 Am.
Dec. 390 (1861).
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if he cannot make settlement with the remaining partners, pro-
ceed to have determined by a bill in equity for a partnership
accounting.
1 2
Certain weaknesses will be apparent in the above set out
procedure. At such an execution sale a purchaser acquires only
an undetermined and sometnes undivided interest. This per-
force will embarrass a sale, deter bidders, encourage collusion
and prevent property bringing anything like its true value, as
witness the fact that in the Tennessee case pipe reasonably worth
fifteen hundred dollars ($1500) sold for only fifteen dollars
($15.00)
Clearly it would be sound procedure to ascertain the debtor's
interest before sale and the Ohio court holds that the levying
creditor may file a petition and make other partners parties
defendant for the purpose of ascertaining that interest before
execution sale.13  Either the creditor or co-partner may invoke
equity jurisdiction to stay the execution in such case. But if
neither party so elects the officer executing the writ must sell
the apparent interest of the debtor in the chattels levied upon.
Upon such eventuality the purchaser and other partners become
tenants in common subject to a lien in favor of such partners and
firm creditors of the interest of the debtor partner in the hands
of the purchaser for any balance due upon final adjustment of
the partnership account.
In a recent Florida case the appellant was the purchaser at
an execution sale, and filed an equitable action for an account-
ing and determination of claims of creditors against the part-
nersip assets and distribution of surplus, if any, to the partners
entitled thereto. 4
The question as styled by the court was, "Whether a judgment
debtor s individual interest in a partnership can be reached by
execution." In this 1948 decision the court said it knew of no
"Eighth National Bank of City of New York v. Fitch, 49 N. Y. 589 (1872).
Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647, 80 Am. Dec. 390 (1861). As to whether
a creditor of a separate partner may garmshee a debt due the firm, see, Spring-
field Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Huntington National Bank, 229 Ky. 647 17 S.W 2d
726 (1929), and compare situation where plaintiff is a creditor of all the partners
on a non-partnership obligation. Boggs v. Brooker 79 S.W 2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934); McCool v. O'Brien, 289 Ky. 729, 160 S.W 2d 28. Judgment debtor by
statute has the right to redeem property within one year where at execution sale
it does not bring at least two-thirds of its appraised value." B. A. Lott v. Padgett, 14 So. 2d 669 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1943).
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law in this state to aid in answering the question and that there
was a diversity of opinion elsewhere. The court expressed the
sound proposition that no one partner has a right to possess any
partnership property to the exclusion of other partners, thus it
seems ruling out by dicta, at least, a levy on specific partnership
property The court accepted and reaffirmed the generally ac-
cepted view that the interest of each partner is that undivided
portion of partnership assets which may remain after all partner-
ship debts are paid." Once that interest is sold at execution
sale, the partnership is at an end, the court states, and the execu-
tion purchaser becomes the owner of the property interest
of the debtor subject to the burden of its proportionate share of
firm debts. The court found that the purchaser might maintain
a bill in equity to have this newly acquired property interest
adjudicated and determined and the surplus divided between
the parties in accordance with their proportionate interests.
The resum6 and discussion of the Florida case is included
here not because it takes a minority stand or presents a novel
situation as it, in fact, presents the normal situation and holding,
but rather for the reason that the court points out that as late
as 1943 it has no established precedent on the law of the case
involving a controversial subject, and for the further reason that
the case deals with procedure to enforce the creditor's right on
which this article places a degree of emphasis.
Our problem is presented in a different setting in the much
discussed case of Doner v Stauffer iG In this Pennsylvama case
decided well over a centurv ago, judgments against each of two
partners on individual debts, with concurrent levy of execution
on each partner's interest in the firm, and sale which united
partners interest in one purchaser, resulted according to the
court's theory of the case in the whole of the partnership effects
being swept away, thereby destroying the rights of the partners
to apply fi-m property to payment of firm debts with consequent
destruction of the derivative rights of firm creditors. In the
course of the decision it is stated that the preference m favor of
a firm creditor is founded on no inherent merit but rather on
' Succession of Pilcher, 39, L. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887), 40 Amr. Jun., 447.
ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP Sees. 830-831.
" Doner et al v. Stauffer et al, I Penn. & W 198, 21 Am. Dec. 370 (S. Ct. Pa.
1829); also see Case v. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119, 25 L. Ed. 370 (1878).
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the equity wich springs from the nature of the contract be-
tween the partners themselves; that a separate execution credi-
tor sells not the chattels of the partnership, but the interest of
the partner encumbered by joint debts. How can itbe logically
contended that a purchaser of a portion takes only an undeter-
mined interest, but a purchaser of all takes the chattel itself
so as to cut off clamis of creditors?
7
Possibly the Pennsylvania court was not convinced of the
sound reasoning in the Stauffer case, for when the problem was
presented fifty-eight years later it saw fit to restrict the doctrine.'8
In this case a constable levied executions, issued against the
individual members of the firm, upon firm property Before sale
the sheriff levied an execution on the firm property, issued on a
judgment against the firm. The court recognizes the rule in
Doner v Stauffer stating that if partnership property is disposed
of by judicial or private sale, the equity of partners to have firm
assets applied to firm debts is destroyed. But here the sheriff's
levy created a lien on the property itself not on just an interest
and the vendees under the constable's sale would be entitled to
relief only after satisfaction of execution levied by the sheriff.'"
If we accept as sound law the generally stated proposition
as to what a partner's individual interest is ,it seems unsound then
for the court not to distinguish between a voluntary sale of a
partnership and a judicial sale of all a firm's assets by virtue of
concui-ent levies. A bona fide sale for good consideration leaves
the firm assets intact and available to both classes of creditors.
A forced sale, even though the purchaser knows he is purchasing
not just an interest, advertises that a firm is in financial straits
and attracts purchasers looking for a buy at sacrifice prices. The
Pennsylvania cases present the minority view in permitting
creditor's equities to be extinguished in such manner. -0
We have seen from the discussion and cases cited that a
partners interest may be levied upon at the instance of an in-
dividual creditor of that partner.2i Developing the problem
11 The question may be further pursued through a discussion in 29 HAv. L
1 n,. 158, 162.
" Richard v. Allen, 117 Pa. 199, 11 A. 552 (1887).
"See, Powers v. Powers et al, 35 N.W 53 (XVis. S. Ct., 1887); Swan v. Gil-
bert, 175 Ill. 204, 51 N.E. 604 (1907).
"Farley v. Moog, 70 Ala. 148, 58 Am. Rep. 585.
FnntrxmAN, EXECUTIONS (2d Ed.) Sec. 125, "It is universally conceded
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from this point consider this statement, " confessedly a sale
under an execution against one partner does not divest the title
of the partnership in the property 2 2 Continuing, the court says
that the sale transfers only such interest as remains in the judg-
ment debtor upon settlement of the affairs of the partnership.
As the rights of the partners are paramount this would seem to
preclude the officer serving the writ from taking the property
into his exclusive possession, even for the purpose of levy and
sale. Practically speaking, this seems sound in that property
necessary to furtherance of a partnership venture could remain
in the possession of partners subject to orders of the court. In
accordance with this statement some courts hold that the sheriff
is not entitled to exclusive possession as the debtor partner is
not.23 In such case it is sufficient to declare there is an attach-
ment or execution designating the property levied upon, or other-
wise according to local practice. However, we must concede
that the majority view seems to be that to guard against inter-
mediate sales and to make the levy effectual the sheriff is re-
quired to take possession of the partnership property 
4
At common law the rule was that the assignment by a part-
ner of his share in partnership property automatically worked
a dissolution making winding-up proceedings necessary 25 It
would seem to follow as a logical implication that a levy on one
partners interest, m effect an involuntary assignment, would
create the same result. However, the courts do not seem al-
together certain on this point. In Hershfield v Kansas2 the
court states:
and as the sale of the property must dissolve the co-
partnership to the extent of that property, so must the
that, except where some statutory provision to the contrary has been enacted, the
interest of the partner is liable to an execution for Ins individual debts."
Johnson v. Wingfield, supra, footnote 8.
17 Am. & ENr. ENCYC. LAw, 1340, and cases cited.
Clark v. Cushing, 52 Cal. 617 (1878); White v. Jones, 38 Ill. 159 (1865);
Hershfield v. Chaflin, supra footnote 10. An execution by a partnership creditor
is effective and entitled to pnority as to specific property, Darnall v. State Nat'l.
Bank, 59 Okla. 204, 158 P. 921 (1916). Other partners may enjoin sale by
sheriff on execution against one partner, Williams v. Lewis, 115 Ind. 45, 17 N.E.
262 (1888). Leaving the property in the custody of the other partners is not
an abandonment of the levy, except perhaps as against third persons. Mornson
v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 238, 29 Am. Dec. 653 (1873).
zKarnck v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328, 18 S. Ct. 135 (1897); Morss v.
Gleason, 64 N. Y. 204 (1876); McCall v. Moss, 112 Ill. 493 (1885).
' Supra, footnote 10.
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seizure alone dissolve it, or at least suspend it to the same
extent, while the officer holds the property m his custody
Perhaps it would be proper to say that the mere seizure
of the property dissolves the copartnership from the time
of the seizure, on condition that the property shall after-
ward be sold."
The conclusion of the court that levy and the seizure of
partnership property works a suspension of partnership affairs
only pending the actual sale leaves the door open for alterna-
tive action by the partners or firm creditors. Possibly the debtor
partner can m the meantime raise money to discharge the judg-
ment and stay the execution. Or again, possibly as is set out
in Nixon v Nash 27 the creditor or other copartners may wish to
invoke the powers of equity to stay proceedings under the execu-
tion until the beneficial interest of the debtor partner is ascer-
tained. Failing such election followed by sale of goods levied
upon the purchaser becomes, not a partner but a tenant m
common with the other partners. The court continues to the
effect that the seizure and sale is, pro tanto, at least, a dissolution
of the joint business and calls for an adjustment of the business
affairs. The judge who writes the opimon in the Nixon case
gives a very clear albeit brief explanation of the procedure in
the event of the happening therein and is in accord with the
majority holdings. -8
The discussion herein and comments as to majority decisions
has been limited to the law in jurisdictions not adopting the
Uniform Partnership Act or prior to such enactment. Let us then
consider briefly provisions of the Act and its effect on the in-
dividual creditor's rights in firm property
Sections 24-28 of the act are given over to defimng the prop-
erty rights of partners. Section 25 (2) (c) provides as follows:
"A partners right in specific partnership property is not
subject to attachment or execution, except upon a claim
against the partnership."
Mr. Crane in his treatise on Partnership states that draftsmen
of the Uniform Act in order to reach a solution of our problem
' Supra, footnote 13.
' Johnson v. Wingfield, supra footnote 8; B. A. Lott v. Padgett, supra foot-
note 14; STORY, P~nTNERsmp see. 268; CRANE, PARTNEnsaI see. 43.
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that would protect creditors and partners were directed to pro-
ceed on the theory that a partnership was a legal entity 9 He
further states that though this direction was later changed the
provisions of the act produced, as to separate creditors, the same
result as though the partnership were avowedly a distinct legal
person. Further in regard to levy on firm assets at instances of
individual creditors he states, "Nothing can be attached or seized
on execution by his creditors."
30
It may be that such was the intent of the framers of the act
but it is the contention of the writer to the contrary, that
the charging order authorized by Section 28 of the Uniform Act
is an alternative remedy to levy on all partnership assets at the in-
stance of an individual creditor.
With the thought in mind that courts had permitted levy and
seizure of all partnership property but had been in conflict as
to the right to levy on specific property of the partnership, it is
apparent that the act by its express words prohibits such levy
and execution and none other.
In a decision involving a construction of the Uniform Part-
nership Act it was held that the act providing among other things
that a partner s right in specific property is not subject to attach-
ment or execution except on a claim against the partnership,
where action was brought against a partner for breach of con-
tract made in Switzerland, service of warrant of attachment on
a domestic corporation did not effect a valid levy on the partners
interest in stock in the accounts of the partnership.3 In this
case the warrant was served on a company that held a specific
interest of the debtor partner, so it is apparent that the court
was not called upon to meet the writer's contention head-on.
However, the following statement in the opimon is very
significant:
"There is no express provision authorizing the attachment,
prior to judgment, of a partners general interest as dis-
tinguished from his right to specific partnership property
CRANE, PARTNEnsIIp see. 43.
Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Criticism, 28 HAnv. L. REv. 762, 773.
3 1Dalinda v. Abegg, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 612, 175 Misc. 945 (1941). But see,
Sherwood v. Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 8 P 2d 943 (1932). Proper proceeding
was by charging order and it was improper, under the act, to enjoin bank account
withdrawals which is equivalent to an actual levy. Radar v. Coldoff, 228 N. Y. S.
453, 223 App. Div. 455 (1928).
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This indicates by strong implication the right to a general levy
on firm assets at the instance of an individual creditor.
In commenting on Section 25 (c) of the act another jurisdic-
tion says, in part:
32
"While the act which contained specific directions for
the levy and sale m execution of the interest of the judgment
debtor m the partnership has been repealed by the Uni-
form Partnership Act we are not certain that the
general right to proceed against the partners interest has
been taken away"
The opinion continues the discussion by stating that the act
(Section 25 (c)) provides that a partners right in specific part-
nership property (court's emphasis) is not subject to attachment
or execution except upon a partnership claim and that Section
28 provides that a competent court may (court's emphasis)
charge a debtor partners interest for individual debt.
The court may be further quoted, thusly-
"A desire to secure uniformity of procedure m the law of
partnership will not be permitted impliedly to change the
long settled law and practice relating to attachments and
executions."
The court in the above quotation follows a basic principle of
statutory interpretation that a statute which purports to change
the existing law will be strictly construed.
We then concede that specific partnership property is not
subject to levy and execution, as representing the right or interest
of the debtor partner therem, at the suit of an individual credi-
tor,3 contending that Section 25 (c) of the Uniform Partnership
Act effects uniformity on this point, where enacted into law, and
going no further. The answer to this argument is debatable and
the writer has not discovered a case where the court meets the
issue squarely Certainly in jurisdictions where the section has
not been interpreted the practitioner would be wise to be pre-
pared to argue as his interests may lie.
By the foregoing the writer does not intend to leave the m-
'Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande et al, 133 Pa. Super. 181, 2 A 2d
55:3 (19:38).
'Specific property, machmerW and matenals, of a partnershp engaged in
construction work is not subject to attachment by individual creditor. Metropoli-
tan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cimino Co. 108 N. J. L. 248, 157 A 152 (1932).
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pression that his position if correct is desirable. It is firmly be-
lieved that if a partnership is an accepted part of our economic
structure then a wise progressive policy in furtherance of business
relations is sponsored by the uniform partnership in seeking to
prevent attachments or executions at the instance of an individual
creditor. Section 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act in provid-
ing for a charging order in such case with appointment of a re-
ceiver to handle the debtor partner's share of profits and discharge
his judgment debt is a highly equitable solution to a trouble-
some problem.34 Such action protects both classes of creditors
and the remaining partners. Receivership is always costly, yet
a going concern can be preserved with its advantages to the
business associates under such procedure. In the event the
business is not profitable and the receivership proves not practi-
cal, the court may decree a sale without thereby causing a dis-
solution.35
II. Rights of Firm Creditors-Individual Liability of Partners
By way of recapitulation and introduction let it be said gen-
erally that the effects of a partnership belong to it so long as it
continues in existence and not to the individuals who compose it.
The right of each partner extends only to a share of what
may remain after payment of the debts of the firm and the set-
tlement of its accounts. As an integral part of this right there
is the corresponding right to have the partnership property ap-
plied to payment of partnership debts in preference to the debts
of any individual partner. This is an equity the partners have
as between themselves and under certain circumstances it inures
to the benefit of firm creditors.
The latter are said to have a privilege of preference, sometimes
'A charging order against a debtor partner s interest in the firm and ap-
pointment of a receiver for Ins share of the profits contemplates an existing part-
nership in which the debtor is a member and entitled to receive a share of the
profits. Spitzer v. Buten, 306 Pa. 556, 160 A. 444 (1932). The remedy is avail-
able to a partner having a tort clain against a co-partner, Sherwood v. Jackson,
supra footnote 31. The non-resident defendant owned three-sevenths of a profit-
ably operated partnership. He was proceeded against by writ of foreign attach-
ment, and the garnishee was held personally liable where in defiance of the
attachment he paid over to the defendant a share of profits which exceeded
amount of debt sued on. Rankun v. Culver, 303 Pa. 401, 154 A. 701 (1931).
' U.P.A., Section 28 (2).
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loosely denominated a lien, to have the debts owing them paid
out of a firm m the course of liquidation to the exclusion of
creditors of its several members. It is practically a subrogation
to the equity of the partner, to be made effective only through
him. Hence, if the partner is in no position to enforce it, the firm
creditors likewise are not.
So long as the equity of the partner remains in him, so long
as he retains an interest in the firm assets, as a partner, equity
permits firm creditors to avail themselves of this equity and en-
force through it the application of those assets primarily to pay-
ment of debts due them when the property comes under its
administration. It is indispensable to such relief that the partner-
ship property should be within control of the court through bank-
ruptcy, assignment or otherwise. So, if before interposition of
the court is sought the property has ceased to belong to the
partnership through bona fide transfer the equities of the part-
ners are extinguished and consequently that of creditors. 3
Let us at the outset, m discussing rights of firm creditors,
consider then rights at law m enforcing contractual obligations
of the partnership. First, a partnership, in the absence of an
enabling statute cannot sue or be sued in the firm name, not
being a legal entity 37 All the partners should be joined in an
action against the partnership. 3 The generally accepted styling
of a case for, or against, a partnership composed of A, B, C, and
D is, "A, B, C & D, doing business as partners under the firm
name of A B & Co."
It should be noted that to be technically correct, the liability
of partners is too often and too loosely spoken of as being joint
and several. It is true that each co-partner is bound for the
entire amount due on copartnership obligations, and that this
obligation is so far several that if he is sued alone and does not
plead the non-joinder of his co-partners, a recovery may be had
against him for the entire amount due on the obligation, and like-
" See Case v. Beauregard, supra footnote 16; Rice v. Barnard et al, 20 Vt.
479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of the York County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446.
' Gingsberg Title Co. v. Farrone, 99 Cal. App. 381, 278 P. 886 (1929); see
Jansen v. Mundt, 20 Neb. 320, 30 N.W 53 (1886), where the purpose of the
statute was to permit partnership to sue and be sued m its own name as a distinct
legal entity.
'Hall v. Lanmng, 91 U. S. 160, 28 L. Ed. 271 (1875).
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wise a joint judgment may be enforced against the property
of each. 9
This means that the liability of each partner is several only
insofar as in a suit against him, judgment will be rendered against
him for the whole demand, if timely and proper objection is not
made to the nonjomder. This would properly be by plea m
abatement in common law states, demurrer m the code states or
by motion, as local practice requirements may dictate.
It is then the general rule that the partnership creditor hav-
ing obtained a judgment may at his option proceed against joint
or separate property or both by way of levy and execution to
enforce ins judgment.4" It was stated in Dean v Phillips41 that,
"So far as the partner himself is concerned, his separate
property is equally liable with the joint property both in law
and equity for the payment of joint debts. In connection
with this general rule we would iterate and reemphasize
the condition of resultant several liability m an action
against an individual partner on a firm obligation from
failure to object for non-joinder of co-partners."
There is a line of authority to the effect that on a judgment
against a partnership the firm creditor may not proceed against
the partners until he has fully pursued his remedies against the
partnership.42 In the New York case, last above cited, the court
said it is fundamental that the liability of co-partners is ]omt at
law and several in equity The partnership is a joint adventure
with joint ownership of assets and joint liability for debts, and
3D Mason v. Eldred et al, 6 Wall 281, 18 L. Ed. 788 (1867); Tappan v. Bruen,
5 Mass. 193 (1809); Hall v. Lanning, ibzd. Uniform Partnership Act, See. 15,
"All partners are (a) jointly and severally liable for everything chargeable to the
partnership under Sees. 18 and 14. (b) jointly for all other debts of the partner-
ship; a partner who has been held on several liability has a right to contribution
of prorata share from other partners." Hurwitz v. Meltzon, 288 Mass. 488, 193
N.E. 25 (1934). Generally the right will not be judicially enforced until after
final settlement of partnership affairs. Goff v. Bergeman, 97 Colo. 868, 50 P. 2d
59 (1985).
-0 The right of firm creditors to levy execution upon separate assets of an m-
dividual partner, without first exhausting firm assets is well recognized. Hasmith
v. Epsy, 18 Iowa 489 (S. Ct. Iowa 1862). Randolph v. Daly, 16 N. J. Eq. 818
(1868); Ex Parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. Chanc. 119 (1801).
4117 Ind. 406 (1861). A partnerslp debt is the obligation of each mdi-
vidual member thereof and an attachment against individual assets of a partner
to secure a firm debt takes priority over a subsequent attachment by an individual
creditor. Allen v. Wells, 22 Pick. (89 Mass.) 450 (1889).
'-Seligman v. Friedlander, 199 N. Y. 378, 92 N.E. 1047 (1910).
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unless the joint property is insufficient to pay the obligation
there may be no effective recourse to individual property The
court states its reasons in this manner-
1. The rncurrence of a partnership debt presumptively
creates partnership assets and should in reason be
paid therefrom unless insufficient whereupon individual
property may be subjected to the claim.
2. No reason is apparent for leaving partnership assets in-
tact while proceeding against an individual partner on
a joint obligation.
8. The inconvenience and injustice of suing half a dozen
partners individually in as many separate actions with-
out suing the partnership proper or all jointly is obvious.
The court is apparently inescapably sound in its first two
reasons for its rule while it seemingly has in the third reason
overlooked the fact that a partner sued individually on a firm
debt may properly object to nonjoinder of his co-partners.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the New York court has adopted
the more logical holding. Too, the Uniform Partnership Act
tends to this view in limiting joint and several liability to specific
instances set out in Sections 18 and 14 as herembefore noted.
By these sections torts, penalties and breaches of trust are joint
and several while contractual obligations of the partners thereby
become joint only Objections may arise that the New York,
and minority, rule en's in attributing characteristics of legal en-
tity or quasi-corporate form to the partnership. Actually, how-
ever, there is hereby no semblance of limited liability created but
rather an orderly process or procedure for reaching assets of
the parties.
With respect to judgments, at common law a judgment
against all members of a firm for a firm debt is both joint and
several and execution thereon may be levied either on firm prop-
erty or the property of any partner.4 3 But where a statute per-
mits suit against a partnership in the film name a judgment in
an action so brought is generally enforceable against firm prop-
erty only 44
" Webb v. Gregory, 49 Tex. Civ. A. 282, 108 S.W 478 (1908).
"Latta v. Olson & Longman, 187 Iowa 1288, 172 N.W 162 (1919). Judg-
raent against partnership not showing defendant's membership, not otherwise
established, did not constitute a lien on defendant's property. Summer v. Hogsed,
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In a recent New York case it was stated that under the Uni-
form Partnership Act the obligation of partners on a partnership
debt based on contract is joint and not joint and several4 5 So
it was at common law the court says, nevertheless joint creditors
may at law satisfy an execution out of the joint property and
also out of separate property of any one of debtors where it is
shown firm assets are insufficient or it is msolvent, and in an
action on a partnership debt a warrant of attachment may be
levied upon individual property of a partner.40
It has been said that, "There is no doubt that at law the
judgment for a partnership debt attaches and becomes a lien
upon the real estate of each of the partners, with the same effect
as if the judgment were for the separate debt of such partner.."
4 7
It is obvious that such statement is sound if the jurisdiction is
one in which a judgment, as such, creates a lien without necessity
of and prior to, recording judgment or by levy pursuant thereto.
Priority of judgments is discussed at length in a Virginia case
where a number of judgments were rendered against a partner-
ship and the members individually S Virginia has a statute pro-
viling that, "Every judgment for money granted in this state
shall be a lien ", and the court therein finds that a joint
judgment against the several partners on a partnership debt is
a lien on the partnership property and also upon that of the
partners.
Continuing, the court says that as such judgment against the
partnership creates a lien against partners individually it will
take priority over subsequent judgments rendered on the in-
dividual debts of that partner .4  But the converse is not true.
In the absence of statutory provisions a judgment against a part-
41 Ga. App. 207, 152 S.E. 260 (1930). Where partnership is sued and service
had on partners or they appear and defend, property of partners as well as part-
nership assets is subject to execution issuing on judgment entered thereon. Ragan
v. Smith, 49 Ga. App. 118, 174 S.E. 622 (1934).
Gomez v. Vasquea, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 34, 177 Misc. 874 (1941).
"Firm creditors may attach and hold the separate property of any partner
in a suit against the firm or against him. In some jurisdictions this is qualified by
condition that firm assets be- insufficient to meet its obligations or that there is
ground for belief that the firm is insolvent. 47 C. J. pp. 979, 980, Sec. 513.
Where partnership property is attached by several creditors of the same class the
proceeds should be applied m order of attachment. Gay v. Johnson, 32 N. H. 167.
"Meech v. Allen, 17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465 (1858).
" Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 154 S.E. 587 (1930).
49Pitts v. Spotts, 86 Va. 71, 9 S.E. 501 (1889); Lauffer v. Cavett, 87 Pa.
479; Clark v. Johnson, 7 Ala. App. 507, 61 So. 34 (1918).
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ner on his individual obligations is as to partnership property,
subordinate to junior judgments of partnership creditors."0
In concluding, other questions on rights of creditors in firm
property may be treated briefly A dormant partner who ac-
cepts benefits of an association is bound by a judgment against
it though his name does not appear therem.51 And the defense
of infancy and nonresidence are personal and of no avail against
creditors of a firm who are entitled to have firm obligations
satisfied out of firm assets.52
The Uniform Partnership Act covers the obligations of in-
coming partners very clearly m that:
"A person admitted into an existing partnership is
liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising be-
fore his admission as though he had been a partner when
such obligations were incurred, except that this liability
shall be satisfied only out of partnership property"53
The incoming partner is not at common law liable on old
firm debts.54 It will be noted that the Uniform Act imposes such
liability on him only to the extent of his share in the partnership.
In order to render an incoming partner liable to the creditors
of the old fim there must be some agreement, express or tacit
to that effect entered into between him and the creditors, and
founded on some sufficient consideration. If there be any such
agreement, the incoming partner will be bound by it, but his
liabilities in respect of the old debts, will attach by virtue of the
new agreement, and not by reason of him having become a
partnerY"
As to the outgoing partner, he is not released from existing
"Envin s Appeal, 89 Pa. 535, 80 Am. Dec. 542 (1861); Bowen v. Billings
& Co., 13 Neb. 439, 14 N.W 152 (1882).
' Gaines v. Games, 194 Okla. 843, 151 P 2d 393 (1944).
"Pcterson v. WV Davis & Sons, 216 Minn. 60, 11 N.W 2d 800 (1943).
U.P.A., Section 17
' ood v. MacAfee, 172 N. Y. S. 703 (Supp. 1918). "It is universally con-
ceded that when a new member is admitted to a firm he becomes one of the firm
for the future and not for the past." Wolff v. Madden, 6 Wash. 514, 33 P 975
(1893).
"'Wolff v. Madden, supra footnote 54. The party seeking to rebut the pre-
sumption of non-assumption of old debts by the inccming partner has the burden
of proving it, Sternberg v. Ca~lanan, 14 Iowa 251 (1862). Where one partner
retires and conveys his interest to the remaimng member without reference to
discharge of firm debts, a promise to assume them is implied, Cobb v. Benedict, 27
Colo. 842, 62 Pac. 222 (1900), Anno. 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49-121.
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obligations, even though he and the remaining partners so agree,
in the absence of a novation between these parties and creditors. 0
III. Marshalling of Assets
As we have seen from the foregoing discussion a creditor of
a partnership can look to partnership property primarily to
satisfy his claim, or he can, at his option enforce his judgment by
direct levy upon the property of any partner, disregarding the
assets of the partnership. We further saw that a creditor of a
partner individually has no claim on partnership property His
right at best is to proceed against the interest of his debtor m
the partnership property, which may be by levy only on the
whole according to the majority view at common law, or a charg-
ing order under the Uniform Partnership Act. However, when
the insolvent estate of a partner is being admimstered in equity
or bankruptcy, the creditors of the partners are given a priority
over the creditors of the partnership. It is a well settled rule
of equity that as between the joint and separate creditors of
partners, the partnership property is to be first applied to the
payment of the partnership debts, and the separate property of
the individual partners to the payment of their separate debts,
and that neither class of creditors can claim anything from the
fund which belongs primarily to the other class until all the
claims of the latter are satisfied." This briefly is the equitable
doctrine of marshalling assets, and it should be considered with
the question in mind as to whether a doctrine that deprives a
partnership creditor of legal rights m and to the separate estate
of his debtor can be logically defended. It may be argued that
the rule giving firm creditors preference in distribution of firm
assets should of itself give rise in equity to a preference for in-
' Phillips v. Schlang, 139 App. Div. 930, 124 N.Y.S. 40 (1910); Walstrom
v. Hopkins, 103 Pa. 118 (1883); J. B. Speed & Co. v. Traylor, 98 Ind. App. 290,
173 N.E. 461 (1930); U.P.A., Section 36.
"Murrill v. Neill, 8 (Howard) U.S. 414, 12 L. Ed. 1135 (1850). Meech v.
Allen, 17 N.Y. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465 (1858). It is a precept of equity that the
assets of a debtor should be apportioned in such a manner as to secure protection
to the rights of each of a group of creditors, Shoemaker v. White-Dulaney Co.,
181 Wash. 347, 230 P 162 (1924). This is a doctrine prevailing in equity and
not generally enforceable in courts of law, being applicable where neither firm nor
separate creditors can reach assets to have satisfaction by execution of law. Abbott
v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 106 N.E. 782 (1914). Being primarily an equitable
remedy, the rule will not be invoked to disturb existing legal liens (Meech v.
Allen).
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dividual creditors in individual assets.l s This may be defended
by argument that pnmary liability attaches to a fund on which
credit was given, or that joint and separate property are pre-
sumed to be increased to the extent credit is extended to the one
or the other. Such arguments fail to give consideration to actuali-
ties. One who extends credit to a partnership takes into account
the resources of those who make up the firm, and the same is
true with respect to consideration one gives all assets of an in-
dividual in extending credit to him. It is also common knowledge
that business men borrow money on their own for the planned
purpose of putting it in a joint venture. Does either class of
general creditors then have a more meritorious claim as to any
particular fund? Should not in equity then the joint and in-
dividual assets be pooled and commingled without distinction
between separate and firm creditors? It is the writer s contention
that such course should be followed and this is consistent with
the position that a partnership is not a legal entity and that firm
creditor s priority is a defeasible derivative one only
It has been contended that there is no equality in permitting
firm creditors, who have realized 75 percent out of the joint fund,
to come m part passu with separate creditors of a partner whose
assets will not pay 20 percent. The answer is that the percent-
ages may be reversed and the same inequality would result, and
that marshalling does not achieve equality which is the aim of
equity "
"Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Oho St. 179 (Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 1857). The right
of firm creditors of primary resort to firm assets, m postponement of individual
creditor s is derivative and may be defeated by a bona fide waiver by the partners,
but the partners may not transfer or divert assets to defeat the right, Gallagher s
Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 353, 7 Ad. 237 Darby v. Gilligan, 83 W Va. 246, 10 S.E. 400.
See U.P.A. 40 (1) on rank of claims against estate of an insolvenf partner.
'See Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Keizer, 63 Ky. 169 (1865) for a some-
what different approach and application of the doctrine.
